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Abstract
Apart from countries in transition, a large number of developing (and developed) countries have also
established free economic and trade areas (FETA) with the aim of attracting foreign capital by providing
tax incentives, creating employment opportunities and promoting exports as well as regional development.
Major theoretical justifications for the establishment of such economic zones generally maintain that there
are economies of scale in the development of land and in the provision of common services and utilities as
well as external economies of agglomeration by having similar industries grouped together. As mentioned
above, one of the crucial characteristics of the FETA is the provision of generous tax investment
promotion schemes solely allowed in this enclave. In general such measures include: (a) profit tax
exemption, (b) free or accelerated depreciation, (c) investment tax allowance, (d) subsidy for investment
costs, etc. The incentive effects of various tax concessions on firms’ investment decisions can be compared
on the basis of the net present value model. Without taxation, the net present value (NPV) is equal to the
present value of future gross return, discounted at an appropriate interest rate less investment cost. An
investment project is therefore considered to be profitable when the NPV is positive. After introducing the
corporate income tax, the present value of the asset generated from an investment amounts to the sum of the
present value of net return (gross return less taxes) and the tax savings led by an incentive depreciation
provision, for example. In the study the theoretical approach is accompanied by a model simulation based on
the selected parameters.2
Introduction
The establishment of a free economic and trade area (FETA) seems to be one of the most
significant institutional innovations which have widely spread throughout the world
economic scene in past years. The FETA as a territorial enclave in which foreign firms (in
many cases also in co-operation with indigenous companies) benefits from generous
incentives and privileges and thereby producing industrial goods mainly for export, found
popularity in developing countries, notably in the newly industrialised countries in Asia.
The diffusion of this development concept as a growth-oriented policy instrument in
developing countries is likely to continue in the near future. In recent years, however, this
measure has also been adopted in the former centrally planned economies as an instrument
of stimulating economic and structural transformation. The first application of this type of
development measure began with the creation of special economic zones in China.
Nowadays the FETA concept is increasingly gaining importance in other transformation
countries in Europe including the former USSR, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria as well as
in Asian countries such as Vietnam and North Korea (United Nations Centre on
Transnational Corporations, 1990 and 1991).
One of the crucial characteristics of the FETA is the provision of generous tax
investment promotion schemes solely permitted in this enclave. In general, such
measures include: (a) profit tax exemption, (b) free or accelerated depreciation, (c)
investment tax allowance, (d) subsidy for investment costs, etc. In this study the
incentive effects of various tax concessions on firms’ investment decisions can be
compared on the basis of the net present value model. Such a theoretical approach is
accompanied by a model simulation based on selected parameters.
Without taxation, net present value (NPV) is equal to present value of future gross
return, discounted at an appropriate interest rate less cost of investment. An investment
project is therefore considered to be profitable when NPV is positive. After introducing
corporate income tax, the present value of the asset generated from an investment amounts
to the sum of present value of net return (gross return less taxes) and tax savings led by an
incentive depreciation provision. If the investment is self-financed, the interest rate
directly corresponds to the investor’s opportunity cost. Under the assumption of a perfect
competitive market structure, there is only one interest rate in the financial market.
In addition, anticipated effects of inflation on firms’ investment decisions are examined
in the context of corporate income taxation. The central issue is that the so-called
historical cost accounting method, which is applied in practice when calculating the
(corporate or income) tax base, causes fictitious profits in inflationary phases that are also
subject to tax. This type of increased tax burden is generally referred to as inflation loss
(Devereux, Griffith and Klemm, 2002; Gonedes, 1984; King and Fullerton, 1984;3
Streißler, 1982; Feldstein, 1979; Kay, 1977). Therefore, in periods with inflation generous
tax concession measures do not adequately promote private investment in the FETA as
designed, but only (or partly) compensate the losses caused by inflation.
Free Economic and Trade Zones as an Instrument of Economic Growth
and Transformation
Over the last two decades, many developing (as well as developed) countries have
established free economic and trade zones with the aim of attracting foreign capital
through the provision of tax incentives, promoting exports, creating employment
opportunities and promoting regional development (Chen, 1993). Regarding the general
effects of tax incentives (and other public policy measures such as easing of foreign
currency regulations, decentralisation of development policy making, etc.) on firms’
location in the FETA and other types of enterprise zones, Bartik (1991) and Ge (1995)
argue that there are positive relationships between the presence of such incentives and
increased economic activity. In this context the success of a zone is frequently measured
by the amount of investment undertaken after the designation, the increase in the number
of firms in the zone, and the change in zone employment (Papke, 1992). In many cases,
the zone’s achievements have also been measured in terms of exports, technology transfer
and industrial modernisation, diversification of local economies, etc. (Tuppen, 1993;
United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, 1990).
For example, in the context of the so-called open-door policy which has been
promulagated since 1978, the central government of China granted the coastal regions
(special economic zones — SEZs) more autonomy in foreign trade and allowed them to
charge foreign-invested firms lower taxes than permissible in other regions. In this special
economic zone, the corporate tax rate presently amounts to 15%. This compares to the
55% tax rate Chinese firms pay elsewhere in the country and the 33% levied on foreign-
funded enterprises in the hinterland. Furthermore, (a) regions and provinces are authorised
to set up various types of trading corporations for their own territories, (b) some selected
enterprises can conduct foreign trade negotiations independently (without the control of
the central government), (c) local governments at different levels and enterprises can retain
part of their foreign currency earnings, and (d) some provinces such as Guangdong and
Fujian were allowed to transfer a smaller share of tax revenue to the central government.
Not surprisingly, these special economic zones have made major contributions to the
remarkable growth of Chinese exports and national income. By attracting investments
from abroad, SEZs have also provided access to business know-how in light industry and
the service sector. To a certain extent, they have also had significant impact on the inflow4
of modern high-technology (Wall, 1993). On the other hand, this type of growth-pole
oriented policy has led to a serious spatial imbalance caused by the concentration of
foreign direct investments in coastal regions and has consequently widened the east-west
disparity in the economic growth of Chinese regions (Bishop, Formby and Zheng, 1996).
Besides, major theoretical justifications for the establishment of such economic zones
generally include that “... there [are] economies of scale in the development of land and in
the provision of common services and utilities [and] ... external economies of
agglomeration by having similar industries grouped together. [Furthermore]...
governments may wish to impose a geographical limit on the operation of some policies ...
and... to restrict certain activities to specific areas” (Wall, 1993, p. 248). For the
application of the latter justification in the transformation countries, it is additionally
suggested that, with the enclave nature of the FETA, the process of gradually opening
former command economies to the outside world can be controlled and modulated in a
much more subtle and sophisticated way than through a rapid global liberalisation of the
total national economy (United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, 1990).
According to the theory of agglomeration economies, economic growth and technology
development — particularly at the regional level — is influenced and stimulated by the
economies generated by spatial proximity and associated externalities (Glaeser et al.,
1992; Mills and McDonald, 1992; Moulaert and Djellal, 1995). By being located near
various numbers and types of firms in agglomerations or free trade and economic zones,
an easy and speedy business access (with low transportation costs) to other service and
industrial firms (suppliers, distributors etc.) or research institutions is guaranteed.
Furthermore, in the case of expanding similar industrial branches in a given location, firms
can realise economies of scale by using jointly supplied products (and raw materials) or by
specialising in production. An additional benefit includes the savings resulting from
intensive sharing of given major capital investment and infrastructure by a number of
firms in a geographic enclave. Within an economic zone that has a concentration of rapidly
growing (foreign and domestic) firms in an emerging dynamic industry and service sector,
the recruitment of a specialised labour force is also convenient: modern industrial and
service firms “that are growing quickly need to be able to recruit specialised, experienced
and skilled professionals who can meet specific requirements” (Mills and McDonald,
1992, p. 42). Additionally, such a geographic proximity makes the inter-firm
communication of new ideas, experiences and know-how among firms more efficient and
innovative (the so-called Marshall-Arrow-Romer externality of knowledge spillovers
between firms, Glaeser et al., 1992). Consequently, such advantages of agglomeration
economies provided by a FETA can have a positive effect on a local economy and
stimulate efficient production and generate productivity growth leading to higher per
capita income than that in the rest of the country (Bartik, 1991).5
In recent years the concept of FETA has evolved and has been diversified. The
following facts illustrate this development. Instead of being further concentrated in a well-
defined territorial area, investment and other types of incentives provided in FETAs (like
tax concessions, easing of foreign currency regulations, etc.) were gradually extended —
in the course of time — to other (local or foreign-owned) enterprises, operating elsewhere
in the country (see cases in Hungary).
A number of export-processing zones additionally acquired import-processing functions
(see the case of Manaus Free Zone in Brazil that now operates almost exclusively for the
domestic market). Major factors which have made such trends towards import processing
almost inevitably include:
•   the technical difficulty of controlling smuggling (products and technologies) from the
zone into other parts of the host country,
•   the combined pressures of local consumers (who would like to have access to and can
also afford the high-quality goods produced in the zone) and foreign investors (who are
attracted by the potentially high profitability of sales in the local market, as is the case
in China), and
•   governments’ policy to encourage local linkages in exchange for access to the local
market.
A third important development was the establishment of domestic firms in the FETA. In
countries such as India local participation is compulsory when a foreign firm wants to
invest in the country’s FETA. This growing importance of domestic enterprises is well-
illustrated by the fact that over two thirds of all enterprises located in the FETA of
developing countries are presently either fully-owned indigenous firms or joint ventures
between domestic companies and foreign partners.
In China the special economic zones were rapidly expanded along the large coastal
areas, rather than remaining as small industrial enclaves. The selection of initially four
SEZs in the southern part of China in 1978/79 was mainly aimed at achieving a
geographic proximity to Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan in order to fully exploit the
advantage of the highest concentration of overseas Chinese. Regarding the foreign
investment activities, some significant shifts were made thereafter. These include, for
example, moving away from the SEZ to a broader geographical spread leading to the
subsequent expansion of SEZs along the coast, shifting concentration from real estate
development (including hotels and other tourist facilities) towards industry, and turning
away from joint-venture-based investment to wholly owned enterprises (Wall, 1993).
In the near future the evolution of classical manufacturing-oriented FETA into a modern
service-oriented zone is expected. This mainly reflects the growing importance of the
service sector in total economic activities and the increased tradability caused by the rapid
development of information and telecommunication technology. In other words, the6
growing service-orientation of some FETAs is, therefore, a much wider and more
ambitious concept than the free ports, because it encompasses not just traditional trading
and transporting activities but also modern financial and business services such as
banking, insurance and data processing. The concept of FETA as such a service-oriented
(and services-cum-manufacturing) zone could also encompass some tourism or
educational services (United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, 1991).
However, according to past experiences world-wide, FETAs have not usually developed
along lines originally planned. Furthermore, the economic and social benefits of a zone
tend to be much greater (or much smaller) than anticipated, and in most cases quite
different from what had originally been planned. These facts are well indicated by the
development of a number of zones into industrial mono-cultures, rather than into the well-
balanced and highly diversified industrial parks envisaged by the planners. The
phenomenon is due to a number of complex sociological and economic reasons which
suggest that a FETA maintains a life of its own and an internal dynamism that one can
hardly predict in the planning process. The mistakes made during the planning and design
stage have also led to the failure of FETAs in many countries, which include, for example,
the choice of an underdeveloped region with poor road and air communications;
insufficient attention to the other basic infrastructure (such as telecommunications or
electricity supply, etc.) and to the overall interregional and/or international accessibility of
the region; a mismatch between skills of indigenous work forces and those required for
new production activities, etc. To a larger extent, the successful development of a zone
also seems to be led by the ability and flexibility of the zone authorities to react to
changing (particularly economic) circumstances, to make the necessary mid-course
corrections, to adjust the zone’s institutional structure to new problems arising with zone
development and, more generally, to develop an effective evaluation and problem-solving
mechanism (Tuppen, 1993; United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, 1991).
Effects of Various Tax Concession Measures on Investment Decision
The generosity of different types of tax concessions in combination with corporate tax
rates can be determined on the basis of the so-called Samuelson’s true economic
depreciation (TED). Under the assumption that
•   a self-financed investment costing C generates an infinite stream of future gross return,
•   this return exponentially declines at a given rate (0 < α  < 1) and
•   all prices are constant over time (i.e. π  = 0),
Samuelson (1964) showed in his fundamental theorem of tax-rate invariance that
corporate income taxation does not affect firms’ investment decisions at all, when TED —7
the negative change in value of the asset in the course of time — is deducted from an
expected gross stream of return when calculating tax profits (see also Atkinson and
Stiglitz, 1980). And the TED rate is the same rate at which the gross return declines in the
course of time (i.e. the TED rate = α ).
In the absence of taxation and also in the case of profit tax exemption, an equity-
financed investment project is on the margin of acceptance at the year of investment, when
                      ∞                                A0
(1) C  =  PV0  =  ∫  A0e
–(α +r)u du  =  ———  ,
                      0                               α +r
where Au (= A0e
–(α +r)u ) means gross return at year u and r is the real interest rate (0 < r <
1) before imposing corporate tax. In such an equilibrium, the NPV amounts to zero.
If cash investment subsidy is provided at the year 0, the equilibrium condition of the
equation (1) changes to
                            ∞                             A0
(2) C – kC < PV0 =  ∫  A0e
–(α +r)u du =  ——— ,
                            0                            α +r
where kC is the total amount of cash subsidy at the investment year. By the given PV0 this
subsidy is equivalent to the extra profit for the investor.
Accelerated depreciation is generally used in combination with the straight-line
depreciation method. Accelerated depreciation expense (as a certain percentage share of
investment cost) is tax-deductible in the first year of a capital good’s tax life.
Consequently, total depreciation expense in the first year reaches
                         C
(3) D1
ad+sld  =  σ C + —— ,
                      Γ
where σ  indicates the accelerated depreciation rate (0 < σ  < 1), and C/Γ  denotes the annual
sum of straight-line depreciation over Γ  tax lives.
Because an extra amount of expense can be deducted in the first year, the total tax-life
of a capital good is reduced correspondingly from Γ  to Ω . And
(4) Ω   =  (1 – σ )Γ   .
The present value of the asset with accelerated depreciation at year 0 is8
                       ∞                                 1
(5) PV(t)0
ad  =  (1–t) ∫  A0e
–{α +r(1–t)}u du + t ∫  σ Ce
–r(1–t)u du
 0                                 0
       Ω
  + t ∫  (C/Γ )e
–r(1–t)u du
                    0
                            σ {1–e
–r(1–t)}        1–e
–r(1–t)Ω               α
  =  PV0 + tC[————— + ————— – —————]  .
                                r(1–t)                r(1–t)Γ           α +r(1–t)
In the context of free depreciation the total amount of investment cost can be written off in
the first year. When employing this depreciation method, the present value of asset at year
0 is
∞                                 1
(6) PV(t)0
fd  =  (1–t) ∫  A0e
–{α +r(1–t)}u du + t ∫  Ce
–r(1–t)u du
                       0                                 0
                              1–e
–r(1–t)               α
  =  PV0 + tC{————— – —————}  .
                                 r(1–t)            α +r(1–t)
Furthermore a certain percentage share of investment cost referred to as investment tax
allowance can be deducted from gross profit in the first year when calculating the tax base.
Investment tax allowance is also used in combination with straight-line depreciation.
Unlike the case with accelerated depreciation, the total tax-life of a capital good remains
unchanged. As a consequence, this type of tax incentive provides possibilities of
depreciating the value, which is significantly higher than the original investment cost of a
capital good.
With investment tax allowance the present value of asset at year 0 is
                             ∞                               1                                 Γ
(7) PV0
ita  =  (1–t) ∫  A0e
–{α +r(1–t)}u du + t ∫  (β C)e
–r(1–t)u du + t ∫  (C/Γ )e
–r(1–t)u du
                        0                                  0                               0
                           β {1–e
–r(1–t)}      1–e
–r(1–t)Γ                  α
=  PV0 + tC[ ————— + ————— – ——————]  ,
                                r(1–t)       r(1–t) Γ                α +r(1–t)
where β  indicates the rate of investment tax allowance (0 < β  < 1).9
Consideration of Fictitious Profit and Inflation Losses
In an economy with the constant annual inflation rate π , the stream of nominal gross return
which is generated by an investment costing C at year u can be expressed as
(8) Au = A0e
–α ue
π u = A0e
–(α –π )u  .
In this case, the sum of annual gross return exponentially decreases at rate α  but increases
at rate π  over the course of time.
The size of fictitious profits and the additional corporate tax burden, which are caused
by applying the historical cost accounting method in the inflationary phase, can also be
measured on the basis of the net present value model. Such inflation losses lead to the
reduction of nominal net present value. More precisely, the amount of increased tax
burden caused by inflation can be described as the difference between the two nominal
PVs, one with depreciation measured on the basis of current (replacement) value of a
capital good and the other determined on the basis of the historical cost accounting
method.
In the case of employing the historical cost accounting method, the nominal present
value of the asset with straight-line depreciation at year 0 is
                          ∞                             Γ
(9) nPV(t)0
sld  =  (1–t) ∫  A0e
–{α –π +µ (1–t)}u du + t ∫  (C/Γ )e
–{µ (1–t)}u du
                         0                            0
                             (1–t)A0            tC{1–e
–µ (1–t)Γ }
                   =  —————— + ——————  ,
                          α –π +µ (1–t)              µ (1–t)Γ
where the nominal interest rate µ  = r + π .
On the other hand, when depreciation expense is determined on the basis of current
investment cost, the nominal value of the asset with the same depreciation method at year
0 is
                            ∞                                     Γ
(10) nPV(t)0
sld*  =  (1–t) ∫  A0e
–{α –π +µ (1–t)}u du + t ∫  (C/Γ )e
–{µ (1–t)–π }u du
                             0                                    0
             (1–t)A0            tC{1–e
–{µ (1–t)–π }Γ }
                     =  —————— + ———————  ,
                       α –π +µ (1–t)           {µ (1–t)–π }Γ10
where the current investment cost at year u is Ce
π u.
The difference between nPV(t)0
sld and nPV(t)0
sld* is defined as the present value of
additional corporate tax burden (inflation losses) at year 0 (ATB0
sld), which is caused by
the fictitious profit. With the economic life of a capital good Γ *, therefore
             1–e
–{µ (1–t)–π }Γ *     1–e
–µ (1–t)Γ *
(11) ATB(Γ *)0
sld  =  tC[—————— – ——————]  =  tC(FP0
sld)  ,
      {µ (1–t) –π }Γ *      µ (1–t)Γ *
where FP0
sld indicates the present value of fictitious profit per monetary unit at year 0 in
the case of adopting straight-line depreciation. In order to examine whether and to what
extent generous tax depreciation provisions promote private investments in inflationary
situations, the value FP0
sld (with Γ *) can be adopted as the benchmark.
When the amount of annual depreciation expense is calculated on the basis of historical
cost, the incentive effect of accelerated depreciation on private investment in an
inflationary phase can be measured by
(12) nPV(t)0
ad – nPV(t, Γ *)0
sld
              σ {1–e
–µ (1–t)}      e
–µ (1–t)Γ * – e
–µ (1–t)Ω *
=  tC [—————— +  ————————]  =  tC(IE0
ad)  ,
                 µ (1–t)                    µ (1–t)Γ *
where nPV(t)0
ad is the nominal present value of the asset with accelerated depreciation at
year 0 and Ω * denotes the reduced tax-life of a capital good, when Γ  = Γ *.
With free depreciation,
(13) nPV0
fd – nPV(Γ *)0
sld
   1–e
–µ (1–t)             1–e
–µ (1–t)Γ *
=  tC{—————— – ——————} = =  tC(IE0
fd)  ,
                µ (1–t)                  µ (1–t)Γ *
where nPV0
fd indicates the nominal present value of the asset with free depreciation at year
0.
When investment tax allowance is adopted and the tax-life of a capital good is Γ *,
(14) nPV0
ita – nPV(Γ *)0
sld11
   β {1–e
–µ (1–t)}
=  tC[——————]  =  tC(IE0
ita)  ,
                µ (1–t)
where nPV0
ita is the nominal present value of the asset with investment tax allowance at
year 0.
Subsequently, generous tax concession measures simply compensate the inflation losses
in full-scale when
(15) IE0
ad  =  FP0
sld
(16) IE0
fd  =  FP0
sld
(17) IE0
ita  =  FP0
sld   .
In spite of inflation, tax concession rules shown above guarantee investment promotion
effects when IE values (i.e. IE0
ad, IE0
fd and IE0
ita ) are greater than FP0
sld.
Model Simulation
Table 1 illustrates NPV under different tax concession measures calculated using standard
parameter assumptions in an economy without inflation (i.e. π  = 0). The derived ranking
of investment promotion effects (i.e. the extent of tax paradox) varies from one measure to
another in the investigated range of corporate tax rates. For example, free depreciation
provides the highest NPV within a range of tax rates between 10% to 45%, while the same
value under investment tax allowance is highest when t = 50%. Accelerated depreciation
guarantees a higher NPV than investment tax allowance does, when, for example, t =
10%.
Repeatedly, the application of the historical cost accounting method in calculating the
corporate tax base causes fictitious profits in inflationary phases that are also subject to
tax. For example, in spite of inflation the ‘true’ incentives can be guaranteed by free
depreciation under the given parameter assumptions including t = 20%, when π  reaches
approximately 25% (Table 2). However, with the same tax rate accompanied by π  = 14%,
the promotion effects of accelerated depreciation disappears altogether. Furthermore the
stimulation of private investment through the adoption of investment tax allowance cannot
be expected when the inflation rate is higher than 7%. Additional tax burden positively
correlates with the tax rate by the given inflation rate. As a result, the compensation of12
inflation losses through tax concession measures ceteris paribus takes place with lower
inflation rates, when t increases to 40%.
Table 1 Investment Promotion Effects of Tax Concessions without Inflation
Free depreciation Accelerated depreciation Investment tax allowance Statutory corporate
tax rate for retained






































Assumptions Equity finance; C = PV0 = 333.33; A0 = 100; r = 10%; α  = 20%; Γ  = 10 years;
σ  = 50%; Ω  = 5 years; β  = 20%
Source: Own calculations
Table  2 Investment Promotion Effects of Tax Concessions with Inflation under
Given Corporate Tax Rates
Free depreciation Accelerated depreciation Investment tax allowance



































































































































Assumptions Equity finance; C = PV0 = 333.33; A0 = 100; r = 10%; α  = 20%; Γ  = Γ * =10 years; σ  = 50%;
Ω  = 5 years; β  = 20%
Source: Own calculations13
Conclusion
One important characteristic of the FETA is the provision of generous investment
promotion schemes solely allowed in this enclave. Such measures include profit tax
exemption, free or accelerated depreciation, investment tax allowance, subsidy for
investment costs, etc. From the point of view of the competitive firm which strives to
maximise profits, this study compares, using net present value models, incentive effects of
various tax concession measures under inflation. These effects are determined based on
Samuleson’s true economic depreciation.
According to the calculation made under the given parameter assumption and π  = 0, the
ranking of investment promotion effects changes from one measure to another in the
investigated range of statutory corporate tax rates. For example, free depreciation provides
the highest NPV when the tax rate ranges between 10% to 45%, while the same value with
investment tax allowance (with β  = 20%) is highest when t = 50%. The profit tax
exemption expels the possibility of tax paradox in the standard marginal equilibrium
condition for the investment decision. Furthermore, the subsidy for investment costs is
equivalent to the extra profit for the investor by the given asset value and therefore can
change the investors’ marginal acceptance level.
The aspect of inflation linked with different depreciation rules is of particular
importance in transition and developing countries where their economies have been
confronted with rising prices. In particular the application of the historical cost accounting
method causes fictitious profits in inflationary phases. Therefore, the extra tax burden
increases with the corporate tax rate by the given inflation rate. In this sense the selection
of lower corporate tax rates can also be justified in the FETA. Under the given parameter
assumptions including t = 20% and an annual inflation rate higher than 25%, however, the
free depreciation scheme does not seem to provide any ‘true’ incentive effects but only
compensates such inflation losses.
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